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obtained DNA samples. The confirmation
case has been the model for most uses of
DNA evidence up to now. But the recent
creation of a national database containing
profiles of past offenders means that the
trawl case will become increasingly important over the coming years.
Next, we discuss the NRC's analyses of
the question of whether and how the DNA
evidence should be presented in the trawl
case, and we present our own contrasting
analysis. The first NRC report (NRC I), in
1992, opposed admission of the evidence
altogether. NRC I proposed that a match
discovered after a database search should
provide the basis for performing further
tests on a new sample taken from the suspect identified by the match, but that the
evidence of the initial match should not be
presented to the jury The second NRC
report (NRC II), issued four years later in
1996, takes a substantially more generous
view, but still calls for a testifying expert to
drastically understate the value of the evidence.
In our view, the caution reflected in the
NRC reports and in the analyses of those
who have taken a similar perspective on the
problem is unwarranted. The fact that the
DNA match was found only after a search,
possibly of many thousands of samples,
does not diminish the value of the evidence. On the contrary, the fact that other
potential suspects have been eliminated as
possible sources of the crime sample slightly raises the value of the evidence. No
downward adjustment in the force of the
evidence is appropriate . (Indeed, the confirmation case and the trawl case are really
poles of a continuum, and analysis of the
two cases is fundamentally the same.) It
may well be that the total weight of the evidence is less in the trawl case than in the
confirmation case; there may be less inculpatory evidence in the trawl case, and the
identification of the defendant in that case
may taint any later-developed evidence by
suggestiveness. But this is an entirely
different matter, and one that can be left to
the ordinary process of argument to the jury;
it does not require any rules restricting the
force ascribed to the DNA evidence or the
manner in which that evidence is presented.
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Readers not interested in the issues surrounding DNA database searches may skip
to the final portion of this article (which ·
begins on page 92). There we argue that the
difficulty manifested by the NRC reports
has arisen in part from the tendency of statisticians to export to the legal context
methods that were developed to assist scientific inquiries and that appear more suitable in that context than in adjudication.
But part of the problem also arises from the
tendency of courts to defer to the scientific
establishment with respect to matters of scientific evidence. We suggest that the solution lies less in a "gatekeeping" role of the
type prescribed by Frye, as well as by
Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho, designed to
keep out disreputable expert evidence, and
more in the role of aggressive consumer.
When courts allow experts to present evidence in court, it is to perform a service for
the legal system. The courts should try to
ensure that the experts are doing so in a
way designed to serve the needs of that
system and are not bound by the experts'
own professional habits.

DNA evidence and the
database search problem
To understand the database search problem, it is necessary to understand some
aspects of DNA evidence - but, mercifully,
only some of the less technical ones.
DNA is a remarkably complex type of
molecule that is sometimes said to contain
the genetic blueprint of life. DNA is contained in the nucleus of virtually all cells of
every living organism. Within a given
organism, the DNA is effectively the same
from cell to cell. The entirety of an individual organisms DNA is referred to as its
genome. In humans, the genome consists of
two collections, one inherited from each
parent, of about three billion building
blocks, called bases. Human DNA is
extremely similar across individuals. This
shared genetic material is what makes us
human and distinguishes us from other life
forms. At a multitude of sites in the
genome, however, there are variations from
one human to another; typically, two unre-

lated individuals will differ at about one site
in 1,000. These variations are what make
humans genetically different from each
other. Except for identical twins, no two
humans have DNA that is identical
throughout the whole genome.
The consistency of DNA throughout a
given person's body, and the uniqueness of
a given persons DNA, are what make DNA
evidence so valuable for identification purposes. In determining whether the DNA
from two separate samples comes from the
same person, it is not possible given the
current state of science to compare them
over the whole genome. Current testing
techniques use several markers. Each marker targets a particular place, or locus, on the
genome. For DNA profiling techniques, loci
are chosen that display considerable variability among individuals. In most current
methods, this variability is manifested by
differences in the length, measured by the
number of bases or the number of times a
given sequence repeats, between pre-specified locations. This procedure will yield two
measurements for each sample for each
locus, one for the fathers side and one for
the mothers side.
If the pair of measurements from one
sample at a given locus is the same as the
pair of measurements from another sample
at that locus, the profiles are said to match
at that locus; otherwise, they are said not to
match at that locus. If the two profiles
match at each of the loci examined, the profiles are said to match. If the profiles fail to
match at one or more loci, then the profiles
do not match, and it is virtually certain putting aside, as we do throughout this article, the possibility of laboratory error that the samples do not come from the
same person.
Our concern here is with the case in
which the profiles do match. A match does
not mean that the two samples must
absolutely have come from the same source;
all that can be said is that, so far as the test
was able to determine, the two samples
were identical, but it is possible for more
than one person to have the same profile as
indicated by a test even of several loci. At
any given locus, the percentage of people
having DNA fragments of a given length is

small but not infinitesimal. DNA tests gain
their power from the conjunction of matches at each of several loci; it is extremely rare
for two samples taken from unrelated individuals to show such congruence over
many loci.
But just how rare? That question must
be addressed if the strength of the DNA
match is to be assessed. Databases of DNA
samples from various populations have
been collected, and from these it is possible
to estimate how common any given fragment length is at a given locus. It is typically assumed that the measurements yielded
by each of the markers used in forensic
DNA profiling are independent of one
another. This assumption enables a forensic
scientist to multiply probabilities. This multiplication can yield very low estimates of
the probability that a given innocent person
from the demographic group described by
the database would have a DNA profile
matching the profile common to both of
these samples. Figures in the range of one
in millions down to one in many billions
are typical of profiling systems now in use.
So far so good; there are complexities
and controversies in the process we have
described, but they are not our concern
here, and for the most part this process is
by now rather well-accepted. Our concern
is with the process by which the matching
samples came to be tested, and the implications that this has for the value of the evidence and the manner in which it should
be presented.
DNA can be used to test for identity in
various contexts in litigation, but we will
focus on the most important setting. A
crime has been committed and a person,
assertedly the perpetrator, has left a sample
of fluid or tissue containing testable DNA at
the scene of the crime or at some other
scene associated with the crime. This sample is often known as the "crime sample."
The police know that if they find a person
whose DNA matches that of the crime sample they may have found the perpetrator.
Now we will consider two scenarios by
which the police might find a match. In
each scenario, we will call the person whose
profile matches the crime sample "Matcher."

The Confirmation Case. In the first scenario, what we will call the confirmation
case, there is a substantial amount of evidence pointing to Matcher before his DNA
is even tested. This evidence might include
testimony by a victim of the crime or some
other eyewitness identifying Matcher as the
perpetrator. It might also include a trail of
blood or other circumstantial evidence leading, literally or figuratively, from the crime
to Matcher. In any event, the police, believing that they may have their man, secure a
DNA test of Matcher. Sure enough, the
"suspect sample," as it is often known,
matches the crime sample.
Just how this evidence should be presented is a difficult question. One method
that is widely used, and that at least for present purposes we regard as satisfactory,
states the match probability. This is the probability that, if nothing were known about a
person other than that he was a member of
some defined population, his DNA profile
would match that of the crime sample. This
probability quantifies the rareness of an
"innocent" or "chance" match.
The Trawl Case. In the second scenario
- what we are calling the "trawl case" apart from the crime sample, the police do
not at first have evidence that narrows their
search to one suspect, or even to a few. This
might, for instance, be a rape case in which
the rapist was a stranger to the victim and
was not apprehended immediately after the
crime. But the police do have the crime
sample. And they also have a database containing profiles of DNA samples taken from
a large number of people, one of whom
might be the perpetrator. Sure enough, the
database search yields one profile, and only
one, that matches the crime sample. The
police then try to find further evidence
incriminating the source of that profile,
Matcher, and perhaps they find it. Perhaps,
for example, when Matcher is brought
before the victim, she identifies him as the
perpetrator.
The trawl case will take on increasing
importance in coming years. Development
has been fast in England and Wales, where
since 1995 DNA profiles have been taken
routinely from, along others, all persons
charged with a "recordable offence." As of

July 2000, nearly 80,000 crime samples
had been matched to profiles in this database and more than 11,000 matches had
been made between samples from different
crimes. In the United States, development
of a national database has been much more
complex. In part because of the encouragement, including financial incentives, offered
by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, all
50 states now require designated sets of
convicted offenders to provide DNA samples for analysis. The state databases operate in accordance with national quality
assurance standards and software designed
by the FBI and participate in the Combined
DNA Information System (COrnS) maintained by the FBI. Since October 1998, the
FBI has been able to compare the profile of
a DNA sample from a crime scene with all
the profiles in the system. Thus, corns
now operates in effect as a national database. As of April 2000, laboratories reported analyzing more than 360,000 offender
profiles for entry into corns, with nearly
400 ,000 more waiting to be analyzed. As of
the same time, corns had been responsible for over 600 "hits," assisting in more
than 1,100 investigations. These numbers
will almost certainly increase dramatically
within the next few years.
Over time, one can imagine databases
even broader than the current ones; fingerprints are now routinely taken from
arrestees as well as convicts, and from many
persons not suspected of crime, and it is
plausible to suppose that the same will
occur with respect to DNA samples.
Indeed, the manager of the English database - which operates under fewer administrative and constitutional constraints than
its counterpart in the United States - has
said he expects that eventually it will
include a third of all English men between
the ages of 16 and 30.
And now we can perceive what we have
called the database search problem. In the
confirmation case, the fact that Matchers
sample, the only one tested, matched the
crime sample is clearly powerful evidence
that Matcher was the source of the crime
sample. But in the trawl case, many samples
were tested, without a finger already pointing to any particular suspect. How does this
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER
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factor affect the strength of the evidence of
a DNA match? How, if at all, should that
evidence be presented in court? We now
tum to that problem.

Analyzing the database
search problem
The NRC Reports. In NRC I, a
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic
Science specially appointed by the NRC
said: 'The distinction between finding a
match between an evidence sample and a
suspect sample and finding a match
between an evidence sample and one of
many entries in a DNA profile database is
important. The chance of finding a match
in the second case is considerably higher,
because one does not start with a single
hypothesis to test (i.e., that the evidence
was left by a particular suspect), but instead
fishes through the databank, trying out
many hypotheses."
Thus, the committee pointed out, "[I] f a
pattern has a frequency of 1 in 10,000,
there would still be a considerable probability (about 10 percent) of seeing it by chance
in a databank of 1,000 people." The report
recommended a cautious solution: A match
between an "evidence sample" - what we
are calling the crime sample - and a profile in a database "should be used only as
the basis for further testing using markers at
additional loci." That is, evidence of the initial match should be deemed "probable
cause" for securing a blood sample from the
person so identified, and comparing it with
the evidence sample using markers that
were not used in the initial test. What is
more, if the second test indicates that the
two samples match, "only the statistical frequency associated with the additional loci
should be presented at trial (to prevent the
selection bias that is inherent in searching a
databank)."
NRC II offered an analysis of the database search problem that was quite similar
to that of NRC I, but recommended a substantially more lenient solution. (Actually, as
we explain in our longer Michigan Law
Review article, NRC II offered two somewhat different analyses; we concentrate here
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on the analysis to which NRC II gave primacy.) According to NRC II, an "important
difference," a difference of a "logical" nature:
between the confirmation case and the
trawl case is illustrated by this simple set of
statistical facts:
"[l]f we toss 20 reputedly unbiased coins
once each, there is roughly one chance
in a million that all 20 will show heads.
According to standard statistical logic,
the occurrence of this highly unlikely
event would be regarded as evidence
discrediting the hypothesis that the coins
are unbiased. But if we repeat this experiment of 20 tosses a large enough number of times, there will be a high probability that all 20 coins will show heads in
at least one experiment. In that case, an
event of 20 heads would not be unusual
and would not in itself be judged as evidence that the coins are biased."
Further, contended the report, "[t]he initial identification of a suspect through a
search of a DNA database is analogous to
performing the coin-toss experiment many
times: A match by chance alone is more
likely the larger the number of profiles
examined."
Essential to NRC II, therefore, is the perception that the more profiles examined,
the less probative the evidence. And NRC II
recommends how this supposedly diminished probative value ought to be communicated to the jury. As we have indicated
above, an expert may testify as to the probability that a sample taken from an arbitrarily chosen member of the relevant population would match the crime sample. In
determining that probability, NRC II provides, the expert should take the probability
that she would use if only one sample were
compared to the crime sample, as in the
confirmation case, and then multiply that
probability by the number of profiles in the
searched database. If there are hundreds of
thousands or even millions of profiles in the
database, this adjustment may make what
appeared to be an implausible chance of a
coincidental match - because the probability was so low - seem to be far more
substantial. The DNA Advisory Board of the

FBI has endorsed this approach.
Thus, though the NRC reports differ in
their ultimate recommendations, their
analyses of the database search problem are
very similar. We believe that these analyses,
and those of scholars who have supported
the NRC approach, are clearly wrong. We
cannot show here all the anomalies of the
NRC approach that we discuss in our
longer article. But we will say enough to
show that the NRC approach asks the
wrong question, and that it fails to recognize the full import of evidence of identification based on a database search.
Our View. The proper view of the situation reflects a rather simple intuition. The
value of a DNA match is attributable to the
rarity of the profile. If the DNA of a particular person matches the crime sample, that
evidence strongly supports the proposition
that that person was the source of the crime
sample; that is, the evidence makes that
proposition appear far more probable than
it did before the match was known. That
other samples have been tested and found
not to match does not weaken the probative
value of the match, with respect to this particular proposition, which is the one of interest at the time of trial. On the contrary, this
result somewhat strengthens the probative
value of the match, because it eliminates
some other persons as potential sources.
How probable it appears that the particular
person is the source depends not only on
the DNA evidence but also on the other evidence in the case. If there is no other evidence pointing to him, then the proposition
will not appear as likely as if there were
such evidence - not because the DNA evidence is any less valuable, but because the
prior probability of the proposition is so
low. And evidence found after the DNA
match is determined might be subject to a
ground of skepticism - the possibility of
suggestiveness created by the match itself
- not applicable to evidence found beforehand. Thus, the probability that the defendant is the source of the crime sample may
well appear less in the trawl case than in
the confirmation case, but this is not
because the DNA evidence itself is any
weaker in the trawl case.

Both NRC I and NRC II emphasized
that, as the number of profiles tested
increases, so too does the probability of
finding a match with the crime sample.
That is indisputably true. One can even say
that the larger a database is the more likely
it is that the database will yield at least one
false positive result - a profile that matches the crime scene sample but that does not
come from the source of that sample. But
the conclusion that the NRC reports draw is
that the larger a database is (up to a point)
the less valuable is evidence that a database
trawl yielded a single match. Here the NRC
and its supporters go wrong.
The proposition that the DNA evidence
is offered to prove is not the broad one that
the source of the crime sample is a person
represented in the database. Rather, it is
that one particular person - the defendant in

the case at hand - is the source of that
sample. And the evidence bearing on this
proposition is not simply that there was one
match within the database. Rather, it is that

the DNA of that particular person - alone of
all those tested - matches the crime sample.
Now consider in addition the fact that
other samples have in fact been tested and
found not to match the crime sample. With
respect to the precise proposition at issue
- that Matcher is the source of the crime
sample - this fact can only enhance, not
diminish, the probative value of the DNA
evidence. One reason for this is that the
additional information that a significant
number of persons have been tested and
found not to match the crime sample can
only make the profile of that sample appear
rarer than it did absent that information.
Potentially more important, a number of
people other than the defendant who previously appeared to be possible sources of the
crime sample have now been eliminated,
thus making each of the remaining possibilities somewhat more probable. Assuming,
as is usually the case, that the size of the
database is very small in comparison to the
suspect population, this effect will be negligible, but as the size of the database
increases in comparison to that population,

the effect becomes dominant. If the database includes the entire suspect population, .
then the existence of only one match points
the finger without doubt (assuming accurate testing) at the person so identified. This
fact alone, that the all-inclusive database
makes the existence of one match essentially conclusive evidence, shows that the NRC
analysis, which treats the DNA evidence as
less valuable the more profiles are in the
database, must be mistaken.
The point may be made even clearer by
considering an analogy that draws the
NRC's hypothetical involving repeated coin
flips closer to the reality of DNA testing.
Suppose one coin known to be biased, but
otherwise indistinguishable from all those
in a piggybank, is thrown into the bank. A
tester picks from the bank at random a
handful of coins and flips each of them 20
times. Each lands heads up approximately
10 times except for one coin that shows
heads on all 20 flips. These results are powerful, though not conclusive, evidence that
this one coin is the biased coin that was
thrown into the bank. Just how powerful
the evidence is depends on how common
biased coins are believed to be in the bank.
But two points seem utterly clear: The evidence that the one 20-heads-up coin is the
biased one thrown into the bank is made
stronger, not less strong, by the fact that
other coins were tried and appeared to be
unbiased, and the more other coins that are
tested, the stronger the evidence is.
Thus, the DNA evidence itself is more,
not less probative the more profiles have
been searched. Nevertheless, given the same
DNA match, the entire body of evidence may
well be stronger in a typical confirmation
case than in a trawl case, which involves
many searches. There at least two reasons
why this is so.
First, by definition, in the confirmation
case there is enough evidence independent
of the DNA evidence to cast strong suspicion on the eventual defendant. By definition, that is not true before the database
search in the trawl case, and it may not be
true even after. And it may well be that,
even after the trawl identifies the defendant
as having DNA matching that of the crime
sample, there is little or no other evidence

tending to suggest that he is the perpetrator
of the crime. Assuming•that this is true, and
that the database searched in the trawl case
was not very large in proportion to the suspect population, the entire body of evidence will plainly be stronger in the confirmation case than in the trawl case. Of
course, it may still be strong enough in the
trawl case to warrant conviction.
Second, even if the evidence in the two
cases, the non-DNA evidence as well as the
DNA evidence, is comparable, it may
appear to have greater weight in the confirmation case than in the trawl case. Suppose
that in the confirmation case the police
compile a powerful case against Matcher,
based on circumstantial evidence and eyewitness identification, and only at the end
of their investigation conduct the DNA test.
And suppose that in the trawl case the
police, having identified Matcher as a suspect only through a database search, focus
their inquiries with such success that they
are able to compile the same circumstantial
and eyewitness identification evidence. In
such a case, it may be plausible that the
subsequently discovered evidence was tainted by suggestiveness, given that the DNA
match motivated the police, and possibly
witnesses as well, to confirm the suggestion
that the perpetrator had been found.
These possibilities mean that the confirmation and trawl cases will not necessarily
look the same, even assuming that the DNA
evidence in the two is of a match with the
same profile. But these are factors that a
jury, aided by the arguments of counsel, can
easily take into account. It is not hard, for
example, for a defense attorney to argue,
"Except for this DNA evidence, the prosecution does not have a shred of evidence
against my client. And the prosecutor's own
expert acknowledged that there could well
be several other people in the world with
the same DNA." Similarly, defense counsel
could argue, 'The police and the eyewitnesses were hungry to find the perpetrator.
After they got this DNA match, naturally
they constructed a case to fit the hypothesis
of my client's guilt." No technical expertise
is necessary to make these arguments, and

LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES FALL/WINTER

2000 91

no adjustment in presentation of the DNA
evidence is required.
The two factors discussed above may
account in part for the intuitive sense of
some observers - including the NRC committees - that the probative value of a
DNA match is weakened by the fact that it
is found after a database search. But in fact,
as we have argued, it is not that the DNA
evidence is weakened; rather, it is possible
that the other evidence in the case tends to
be weaker if, and to some extent because,
identification from a database trawl has led
to it.

The aspiration to objectivity
We believe there are also deeper reasons
for the NRC errors, and for the willingness
of legal players to adopt those errors. We
believe that some habits of statisticians and
scientists make them prone to errors of this
sort, and that a judicial tendency towards
deference diminishes the ability of courts to
make good use of scientific and statistical
evidence.
Science aspires to objectivity, to the
demonstration of propositions that are not
dependent on the subjective views of the
observer. Accordingly, it is highly dependent on experiments in which given sets of
conditions are observed many times. By
counting or measuring different consequences in different conditions, a scientist
can hope to draw conclusions on the associations between conditions and consequences.
Accordingly, classical statistics grew up
to facilitate objective inferences from data.
Classical statisticians try to avoid subjective
judgments, seeking instead to determine
what conclusions can be drawn solely on
the basis of frequency of observation. The
Bayesian approach - updating the odds
assigned to a given proposition in light of
evidence subsequently received - is thus
unacceptable to classical statisticians
because it depends on the subjective assignment of odds in the absence of objectively
measurable data. Instead, the classical statistician, having selected a hypothesis to be
tested but without having assigned any
92
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probability to that proposition, observes
whether the results of an experiment are of .
a highly unusual nature assuming the truth
of that proposition. If they are, then the statistician concludes that the hypothesis can
be rejected. Under this approach, great caution must be exercised in testing more than
one hypothesis simultaneously, because the
more observations are made the more likely
it becomes that some will be unusual even
though nothing remarkable happened.
The NRC approach clearly reflects this
classical method. NRC I emphasized that
with a database trawl "one does not start
with a single hypothesis to test (i.e., that the
evidence was left by a particular suspect),
but instead fishes through the databank,
trying out many hypotheses." Thus, no conclusion could be drawn from the fact of a
match produced by the trawl; instead, the
match "should be used only as the basis for
further testing using markers at additional
loci." In other words, the initial match
yielded by the search identifies the hypothesis to be tested, and nothing more.
Though NRC II did not recommend the
same solution, its analysis of the problem
was very similar. Recall NRC IIs discussion
of an experiment in which 20 coins are
tossed in the air repeatedly and eventually
they come up all heads. Applying the
lessons of "standard statistical logic," NRC II
said that this experiment proves nothing,
because given enough trials it is unsurprising that some of them will have unusual
results. And this analogy, NRC II maintained, was on point for the database search
problem, because the more profiles
searched - the more hypotheses tested the greater the chance of finding one that
matches the crime sample purely by coincidence.
The NRC seems not to have recognized
how different the enterprise of law is from
the scientific enterprise for which the classical statistical model was developed. The
problem facing an investigator or a juror is
not to determine a general law of the uni-

verse. Rather, the investigator must try to
determine who committed a given crime on
a given occasion; the juror's job is even narrower, seeking to determine whether a
given person, on whom its attention has
been focused, committed the crime.
Subjective assessment, in light of all the
information legitimately before them, is
essential in allowing both the investigator
and the juror to perform their jobs properly
Sufficiently strong evidence may reasonably
lead to the conclusion that a given person
(whether or not previously identified as a
particular source of suspicion) is the perpetrator even though the prior probability of
that proposition seemed very low. Once the
case is presented to the jury, the jury cannot
decide that it lacks the information to draw
a conclusion, or that it wants to perform an
experiment to ascertain the facts. It must
make its best assessment of the facts on the
basis of the information within its purview.
Thus, where the evidence tends to show
that the person who left a particular DNA
sample at a particular place is probably the
perpetrator, it becomes of importance to the
jury whether the defendant is the source of
that sample. The jury should compare how
likely the DNA evidence would arise if the
defendant were the source to how likely it
would arise if he were not the source. And
the jury should combine these assessments
with its subjective assessments of all the
other evidence in the case to assess the
probability of guilt.
We have, we think, shown why statisticians are prone in a trawl case to provide
the adjudicative system with the answer to
the wrong question. But why does the legal
system appear to be ready to accept that
advice? The answer, we believe, lies in a
longstanding tendency of the adjudicative
system to defer to the scientific establishment.
Courts have long been afraid that juries
will fall prey to "junk science." Thus, they
have demanded that an expert witness'
opinion be in accordance with a theory that
has achieved some threshold level of reputability For most of the 20th century, the
dominant statement of this idea was the

one in Frye v. United States, 293 F, D.C. Cir.
1923, that the underlying "scientific principle or discovery ... from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the
particular field in which it belongs."
Some states still adhere to the Frye test.
But many jurisdictions have justifiably
come to the conclusion that its demand for
"general acceptance" by the relevant scientific community as a pre-condition to
admissibility is too stringent. Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, which has been adopted
in many states, supports this view. The Rule
provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise."
In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, the U.S.
Supreme Court held unanimously that the
"austere standard" of Frye is incompatible
not only with the language of Rule 702 but
also with the liberal nature of the Rules in
general. A majority of the Court went
beyond this ruling, however, and attempted
to articulate the "gatekeeping role" that the
judge must play when "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony"
Justice Blackmuns opinion for the
majority expressly limited this discussion to
evidence based on scientific knowledge, as
opposed to "technical, or other specialized
knowledge," because that was the nature of
the expertise offered in Daubert itself.
Justice Blackmun put great emphasis on
Rule 702s use of the term "scientific . . .
knowledge" and operated from the premise
that, to qualify as scientific knowledge, "an
inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method." Thus, he attempted
to articulate indicia of the scientific method,
and he laid out four criteria that should
often enter into determining "the scientific
validity" of the principles underlying the
evidence. These may be referred to as (1)

testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3)
error rates and standards, and - partially
resurrecting Frye just a few pages after its
apparent death - (4) general acceptance.
Our concern here is not so much with
the much-debated questions of whether
Daubert reflects good philosophy of science,
or even whether it reflects good evidentiary
policy Rather, the point of significance here
is that, though Daubert reflects a loosening
of the demands purportedly applied under
Frye, it still reflects a notable attitude of deference to the scientific establishment. (And
this is an attitude that will be entrenched by
pending amendments to Rule 702, which
barring unforseen intervention by Congress
will become effective December 1 of this
year and will explicitly require the court to
determine whether expert testimony is "the
product of reliable principles and methods
... applied ... reliably to the facts of the
case.") This attitude is apparent in several
respects. Most obviously, perhaps, is the
continued use of "general acceptance" as a
criterion - albeit no longer the exclusive
one - for determining admissibility
Further, the other criteria constitute an
adoption of currently prevalent scientific
methods; the emphasis on peer review and
publication also relies heavily on the attitudes of, and decisions made by, the scientific establishment. Perhaps most fundamentally, the entire inquiry seems gratuitous. Under the language of Rule 702,
nothing seems to depend on whether the
knowledge on which the opinion is based is
"scientific" or not. "[S]cientific" and "technical" are clearly listed merely as illustrations
of "specialized knowledge"; the key question seems to be whether the opinion is
based on "specialized knowledge [that] will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue."
The bite of Dauberts insistence on scientific methods was demonstrated in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
There, the plaintiff attempted to show that
exposure to PCBs, a class of chemicals,
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could promote cancer. He presented the
results of four studies, each of which failed
on its own to provide strong support for
this conclusion. One of his experts, a toxicologist named David Teitelbaum, testified
- somewhat ungrammatically, but comprehensibly enough - at a deposition:
"[A]s a toxicologist when I look at a
study, I am going to require that that
study meet the general criteria for
methodology and statistical analysis, but
that when all of that data is collected
and you ask me as a patient, 'Doctor,
have I got a risk of getting cancer from
this7' That those studies don't answer the
question, that I have to put them all
together in my mind and look at them
in relation to everything I know about
the substance and everything I know
about the exposure and come to a conclusion. I think when I say, To a reasonable medical probability as a medical
toxicologist, this substance was a contributing cause ... to his cancer,' that
that is a valid conclusion based on the
totality of the evidence presented to me.
And I think that that is an appropriate
thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has
been the basis of diagnosis for several
hundred years, anyway"
Justice Stevens agreed with Dr.
Teitelbaum that "[i] t is not intrinsically
'unscientific' for experienced professionals
to arrive at a conclusion by weighing all
available scientific evidence - this is not
the sort of 'junk science' with which
Daubert was concerned." But Justice Stevens
stood alone. The rest of the Court upheld
the trial courts decision that expert opinions like this one did not rise above "subjective belief or unsupported speculation."
A trial court, concluded the majority, could
validly decide to exclude "evidence which is
connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert. A court may conclude
that there is simply too great an analytical
gap between the data and the opinion
proffered."
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The fear of junk science - the concern
that juries will be overwhelmed by chicanery masquerading as science - has thus
exerted a powerful effect on the American
courts. And perhaps a fear of their own
inadequacy to separate the wheat from the
chaff has left them to rely greatly on the
attitudes and methods of the scientific
establishment. We do not mean to deny
that a "gatekeeping role" for the courts is
necessary; we assume that some evidence
offered under the guise of science is of so
little value, and sufficient prejudicial potential, that exclusion is warranted. But we
believe that deference to the scientific establishment in an attempt to fend off junk science may create another problem - failure
to recognize the extent to which, as we
have suggested, the methods ordinarily
used by scientists do not match up with the
needs of the legal system.
The Joiner majoritys castigation of the
toxicologists opinion as "subjective belief'
reflects this failure. Adjudication, we have
argued, depends on subjective assessments
of factual issues, and courts are fooling
themselves if they pretend otherwise.
Sometimes, scientists can present to the
jury generalized propositions of the type
that they try to demonstrate in their ordinary, non-forensic work. But adjudication
usually depends on the particulars of the
case at hand.
Often this means that the law needs to
decide non-recurrent matters for which,
because it is impossible to run a controlled
experiment or even to gather data across
like cases, the scientific method will be useless. And yet, in such cases scientifically
based information may be useful in trying
to determine the facts . The subjective belief
of an expert who has had extensive experience in dealing with problems of a roughly
similar nature may be particularly useful in
bridging the gap between those principles

and the available evidence. This is often the
case, for example, in cases in which an
engineer offers an explanation for an accident that is similar in some respects to
other accidents but unique in some
respects. Even if the experts opinion is not
well grounded on scientific principles, her
observations and judgment, based on
extensive experience, may be useful. For
this reason, we find the Courts decision in
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999), somewhat curious. The expert testimony offered there - that of an expert on
tire failure - was clearly not scientific. But
the Court held that the trial judge had not
abused his discretion in applying the
Daubert criteria. To the extent that judges
apply those criteria in determining the
admissibility of evidence that does not even
purport to be scientific, Kumho will represent a further, and misguided, incursion by
science into the realm of law. Fortunately,
and appropriately, the Court emphasized
that the Daubert criteria are not mandatory
on the trial court - even with respect to
purportedly scientific evidence.
Even if the matter on which an expert
wishes to offer an opinion is a recurrent
one, so that science can in time yield an
answer with confidence, science may not be
ready to do so before the legal system needs
guidance. Unlike scientific inquiry, Justice
Blackmun pointed out in Daubert, law
"must resolve disputes finally and quickly";
evidentiary rules are "designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding
but for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes." But the Court seems to have
failed to realize the implications of that perspective. It does not weigh in favor of
excluding scientific evidence, or of deferring
to the scientific establishment, but rather in
favor of recognizing that the law must satisfy its own needs for scientific advice, even if
doing so does not square with the usual
methods of scientists.
In any case, if a scientist is doing more
than reciting general principles without an
attempt to relate them to the facts of the
case, the laws treatment of scientific evidence must take into account the adjudicative context in which the evidence is
offered. That context differs significantly

from the one in which scientists are used to
working - most notably, with respect to
evidence of a DNA database search, in that
the jury's job is at base a subjective one and
in that the bringing of the case tends to
define the propositions at issue.
Our perspective may perhaps be crystallized by comparing it to that of Anders
Stockmarr, one of the statisticians who has
written in support of the NRC approach to
the DNA database search problem. "The
decision problem of the court," he has written, "should take the implications of statistical hypotheses for data description into
account, and not the other way around." In
our view, this is precisely wrong. The legal
system is a consumer of the information
offered by expert witnesses. It may be that
the service needed by the legal system
requires scientists to operate in ways at variance with their usual operating methods.
The law should not be a passive consumer
of scientifically based information, taking
what scientists have to offer "off the rack."
Rather, it should be an aggressive consumer,
asking its suppliers to provide what it
needs.
This perspective, which has sometimes
been apparent in debates concerning psychiatric testimony, may be helpful across
the range of expert testimony. What the law
needs is not necessarily information
processed in the usual ways of science, but
rather information that will be helpful to
the jurors in making their best subjective
assessment of the particular issues at stake
in the case at hand. Of course, like any consumer, the law can only ask the supplier to
provide what the supplier can. But in the
implicit negotiation between law and science, the law has one advantage that most
consumers do not have: It sets the rules.
The courts should recognize that what they
need from science is not the usual output of
the scientific community, but rather a special product more tailored to adjudicative
needs. Then they may better play the role of
aggressive consumer, and so better secure
information that will be of help to the trier
of fact.
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